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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on 
Corporate Governance, Contracts and Incentives. Abstract 
The institutions of productive systems are structured by mutual interests and 
relative power. Securing mutually beneficial cooperation in production 
requires resolving distributional differences. These objectives are secured in 
liberal economic theory by the working of markets which mediate the power 
of individuals and reward individual success. The centrality of individuals 
and hierarchies in market theory contrasts with developments in labour 
management theory which identifies group activity and decentralised 
responsibility as productive factors and organisations as unitary. This 
neglects the separate interest that productive partners have and the role of 
institutions in resolving conflicts in productive systems to secure productive 
co-operation.  
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This paper represents further development of the ideas presented 
in ‘Productive Systems,’ published in 1983, in the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics’ memorial issue to Joan Robinson. As Joan 
witnessed her life’s work swamped by the resurgence of neo-
classical economics, she increasingly turned her back on what she 
came to regard as the pointless ‘logic chopping’  of economic 
theory and advocated an historical and institutionalist approach. It 
is in this spirit that ‘Productive Systems’ was written; and it is in 
this same spirit that it is being revisited. 
 
The ideas embodied in ‘Productive Systems’ emerged and were 
developed against the backdrop of the economics profession’s 
mass exodus from Keynesianism. It was a strange time. As 
economists puzzled over the burgeoning crisis that was wrecking 
the Golden Age
1, they abandoned the Keynesian Revolution and 
returned the conventional wisdom in economics to its pre-
Keynesian beliefs that money determines prices and that the 
market determines everything else. This neo-liberal revival rests 
on the belief in the existence of immutable laws of the market to 
which organisations and institutions must conform if economic 
welfare is to be optimised.  
 
The starting point for ‘Productive Systems’ was that it is a fatal 
error to believe that institutions must comply with prior laws 
derived from theoretical constructs because institutions are the 
central driving force behind productive systems and the way they 
evolve. This is not to argue that economic theory has no part to 
play. In fact, the dominant economic beliefs are powerful 
institutional forces shaping productive systems and determining 
how they operate. The last sentence in ‘Productive Systems’ read 
‘One traditional function of economists has been to provide 
justification for political answers and the necessary exercise of 
power that they entail: but that is another story’. One of the 
purposes for revisiting ‘Productive Systems’ is to tell that story.  
 
  12. Productive systems 
 
Productive systems are where the forces of production combine in 
production. Their constituent parts are labour, the means of 
production, the social system in which production is organised, the 
structure of ownership and control over productive activity and the 
social, political and economic framework within which the 
processes of production operate. 
 
i. Mutual interests and relative power in productive systems 
There are two distinct elements in the organisation and structuring 
of production: mutual interests and relative power. Labour and the 
means of production are mutually dependent: the one cannot 
operate without the other. Therefore, there can be no doubt about 
the advantage of co-operation in production. It allows for the full 
exploitation of the technical complementarities inherent to 
production and facilitates the sharing of knowledge necessary for 
the effectiveness of production and its improvement.
2 Co-operation 
also fuels the learning processes by which new information and 
knowledge are created, incorporated and diffused, and by which 
new products, processes and organisational forms are developed.
3 
The resulting operational and dynamic efficiencies are crucial 
determinants of the ability of organisations to compete effectively, 
and to respond flexibly to changing circumstances and new 
opportunities. These efficiencies are also important because they 
generate the value added by the productive system, which forms 
the basis for the income and employment security of its various 
stakeholder groups. 
 
In production, relations have both technical and social dimensions. 
The  technical relations of production are the functional 
inter-linkages between labour, equipment and materials within and 
between production processes, the exchange of technical and other 
information pertaining to production and the development of new 
products and processes. These relations are objective and 
impersonal associations, shaped by the technicalities of products 
and of the methods by which they are produced. By contrast, the 
  2social relations of production are the subjective and personal 
associations among the human agents of production. They form 
the social structure for the technical relations of production by 
which the production tasks of labour and the means of production 
are jointly undertaken. By directing, co-ordinating and controlling 
the forces of production so as to assure full cooperation, the social 
relations of production play a central role in determining the 




The centrality of co-operation and mutual interest in production, 
however, does not imply that labour and capital come together on 
equal terms. Although labour works jointly with capital in 
production, workers are much more immediately dependent on the 
relationship. Compared with capital, and with their needs, workers 
have very limited access to resources except through the market. 
Moreover, since the main asset they have, their labour, cannot be 
stored, it is difficult for individual workers to stand out for long 
for a better deal. Labour’s inherent economic weakness is 
fundamental in determining the power of capital relative to labour, 
but it is not the only factor involved. Although, ultimately, 
workers can be coerced by need into compliance with employers’ 
demands, they are not powerless because employers are dependent 
on workers for the use of their capital and for the realisation of its 
productive potential. This coincidence of mutual dependence and 
unequal economic power, which can be countervailed to some 
degree by control in production, is not confined to relations 
between capital and labour; it is ubiquitous in the network of 
supplier and customer relationships within which organisations 
operate.  
 
Generally then, the relationships we are considering are based on 
mutual dependence so that each party is reliant on others to secure 
the best from production. But differences in economic power may 
give one side or the other bargaining advantage over the terms and 
conditions for cooperation, the exploitation of which could result 
in a retaliatory withdrawal from full co-operation and a consequent 
  3lowering of productive efficiency. In this respect, the social 
relations of production have a second crucial role to play, that of 
resolving disputes between the parties to production. Here, the 
distribution of the value added in production is of crucial 
importance: for however mutual interests may be in production, 
they are inevitably conflictual in distribution because what one 
gets the others cannot have. 
 
ii. Mutual interests, relative power and institutions 
Mutuality and power asymmetries are central forces structuring 
not only the internal social and political framework of productive 
systems but also the environment in which they operate. This is 
particularly the case when the role, interaction and evolution of 
broader institutions representing collective interests of productive 
system stakeholder groups (i.e. employees, managers, 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and society) are considered. 
Trade unions, employers’ and trade associations, the state, 
international organisations and other agencies represent collective 
interests; but their form, actions and the outcome of negotiations 
reflect the power differences among their various constituent 
groups. Thus, trade unions and employers’ associations are based 
on shared objectives of their members, but their internal 
organisations reflect the balance of power between sectional 
interests. In their negotiation, trade unions and employers’ 
associations seek to regulate, often jointly, rates of pay and 
conditions of work, and to provide procedures for resolving 
disputes. This results from their mutual interest in the firm's and 
industry's prosperity and the continuity of production from which 
both profits and wages derive. But the outcome of negotiations 
also reflects the power balance both within and between the 
employers' and workers’ organisations and the part this plays in 
the struggle over distributional shares.  
 
Recognition of the co-incidence of mutual dependence and power 
differences is also important for interpreting the activities of the 
state. The provision of education, health, social welfare, law and 
order and the regulation of trade unions and business, can be seen 
  4as furthering the common interest by increasing production, and 
by curbing the destructive exercise of sectional interests. 
Alternatively, state activity can be regarded as serving the 
particular interest of capital or labour. The state may act on behalf 
of capital to curb worker organisation, provide services which 
individual capitalists are incapable of providing and make good 
the corrosive effect of capitalist rivalry on productive resources, 
including the workforce. For labour, the welfare state might shift 
the balance of power in favour of labour by lifting from it the 
burden of poverty, disease and ignorance. No doubt, all of these 
elements play some part in the formulation and administration of 
state policy, and are manifest in the legal and regulatory 
framework and in the other ways by which the state intervenes in 
class and sectional divisions.  
 
At the international level, nation states conclude treaties and 
collaborate in international institutions designed to regulate trade, 
international payments and capital flows. Many of these 
institutions -- for example the IMF, World Bank, World Trade 
Organisation and European Union -- originated in the need of 
nation states to cooperate, to protect themselves from both the 
unregulated international movements of goods and finance, and 
the potentially destructive impact of unilateral attempts to control 
such flows. In this respect, international agencies serve the mutual 
interests of their member nation states by encouraging trade and 
financial interaction. However the form these institutions take, and 
the way they operate, reflect the relative power of different nation 
states, trading blocks and economic regions as well as the leverage 
of interest groups on national governments. 
 
iii. The evolution of productive systems 
The concept of productive systems outlined above has general 
application and provides a basis for analysis at any level -- the 
family, production units, firms, regions and nations.  At each level, 
there is an internal and external network of mutually dependent 
relationships, the terms and conditions of which are settled by the 
interplay of the strength each party derives from their position 
  5within the relationship, and the strength each brings to the 
relationship by dint of their wealth, social, political and legal 
standing, and other means by which relative power is determined. 
Essentially, each productive system, its internal relations, those it 
forms with other productive systems and the terms and conditions 
for their formation and continuance are the unique outcome of its 
own history. Moreover, productive systems are subject to 
continuous change from the interactions among the technical, 
economic, social and political forces to which they are subject.  
 
The evolution of a productive system is therefore a dialectical 
process in which economic and institutional elements dynamically 
interact. Change is generated by developments in products and 
processes, and with changes in productive and power relationships 
both within and between productive systems. These interact with 
the broader economic, social and political framework and both are 
modified in the process. Such forces can lead to the destruction or 
radical modification of productive systems and to the growth of 
new forms. This perspective suggests the notion of an economic 
process radically different from that of ‘equilibration’ of orthodox 
theory. What is implied is a non-equilibrium evolutionary process 
determined by the way productive systems, and their relations with 
other productive systems, mutate in response to innovation in 
techniques and organisational forms as well as shifting power 
balances. Such a process cannot be said to be tending to some pre-
defined  optimum because there is no standard of reference for 
defining what that optimum might be and no way of defining how 
it might be arrived at. The best that can be said is that certain 
productive systems are relatively successful while others are 
relatively unsuccessful. 
 
A relatively successful productive system is one with comparative 
advantage in its overall economic, technical, political and social 
organisation. This does not mean that it is superior in each of these 
dimensions; rather the system’s advantage derives from their 
combined effects A successful productive system is likely to be at 
the forefront of technical and organisational progress and to have 
  6evolved social and political structures conducive to effective 
production. The growth of productivity and the possibility of 
securing favourable terms from other productive systems with 
which it has dealings will serve to increase its wealth and help to 
reduce internal conflicts that could impede cooperation. These 
benign conditions have the potential to create a virtuous circle of 
increasing productivity, competitive success, growth in demand 
and rising prosperity. Examples of successful national productive 
systems can be found in nineteenth century Britain, in the US and 
Germany from the last decades of the nineteenth century and in 
Japan more recently. 
 
A relatively unsuccessful productive system is one where the pace 
of technical advance is slow, productive forces are ineffectively 
utilised, and systems of management, control and industrial 
structure serve to reinforce competitive failure. The slow rate of 
wealth creation is likely to intensify distributional struggles, 
hindering cooperation in production and the ability of the socio-
political system to find an effective solution through 
organisational and institutional reform. In this hostile environment, 
the productive system is under severe pressure but the resulting 
social, political and economic crisis is unlikely to resolve the 
underlying causes of degeneration. On the contrary, the struggle 
over distribution and control will tend to increase the system’s 
inflexibility and hasten its relative decline. Currently, Britain 
might be considered a good example of an outmoded national 
productive system. 
 
3. Mutual dependence and relative power in economics 
 
The claim that productive relations are typified by mutual 
dependence and power, raising issues about co-ordination and 
distribution, is uncontroversial. What is perhaps less so is to 
identify the interaction between mutual dependence and relative 
power as the major force shaping productive systems and how 
they evolve. This section examines how the question of power and 
its possible effects on the cooperation needed for efficient 
  7production is handled in mainstream theories of markets and work 
organisation. 
 
i. Markets and power  
In liberal economics, the theoretical position on power in the 
market ranges from the static neo-classical view in which it is 
neutralised by the market or by organisational authority if markets 
should fail, to the more dynamic notion that the command by 
entrepreneurs over resources and their deployment in the market 
empowers entrepreneurial creativity in the interest of economic 
progress. 
 
Liberal economics rest on the belief in economic man, that extreme 
individualist in whom property rights invest power over the assets 
he or she owns, and who is inherently driven by self interest. On the 
other hand, the division of labour is regarded as the central driving 
force of economic progress, so that increasingly specialised 
individuals are more and more inter-dependent. (Marshall 1947). 
The question then becomes: how can mutual dependence between 
inherently self-seeking individuals be managed so that the resources 
they separately own and control can be put to the most effective use 
in their common interest? Liberal economics offers two alternative 
solutions: (1) the invisible hand of the market; or, (2) the visible 
hand of managerial authority. 
 
a. The invisible hand.  
The core belief of liberal economics is that, assuming property 
rights are recognised, freedom of property disposal is guaranteed 
and contractual promises are honoured, the market co-ordinates 
the activities of individuals. Adam Smith's founding contribution to 
liberal economics was his insistence on the primary role of free 
exchange, both for driving the division of labour and for co-
ordinating the increasingly specialised parts of the system. He 
argued that self interest provides the incentive for specialisation, 
exchange provides the opportunity and free markets co-ordinate 
individual production and consumption decisions.  
 
  8This idea of the pivotal role of market forces for co-ordinating 
productive activity has been handed down to modern neo-classical 
economists. The perfect market based on the freedom of contract 
provides information and price incentives, ensures contractual 
compliance by providing opportunities for buyers and sellers to 
readily switch trading partners among a large number of equally 
well-qualified alternatives; and determines income distribution. 
The importance of a freely functioning market in the present 
context is the role it is given in neutralising individual power, 
thereby ensuring full co-operation among self-interested 
individuals.  
 
But this beneficial effect is limited, argue liberal economists, if 
individuals and groups can marshal the power they have in restraint 
of trade. Trade unions, employers’ organisations and other 
collective monopolies are suspected of restricting supply and fixing 
prices, and their close regulation is strongly recommended by liberal 
economists. They have, on the other hand, a much more ambivalent 
attitude towards dominant firms. As monopolists they are 
condemned for lowering economic welfare, but as the outcome of 
successful competition they are applauded for raising it.  
 
b. The visible hand.  
The neo-classical case for the beneficial effect of dominant firms 
was succinctly summarised by Coase in his seminal 1937 paper. 
He argued that ‘an economist thinks of an economic system as co-
ordinated by the price mechanism’ and posed the question: ‘having 
regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price 
movements, production would be carried out without any 
organisation at all, well might we ask why is there any 
organisation?’ His answer was that organisations provide an 
efficient way of overcoming the market failure which stems from 
the propensity of trading partners to exploit any monopoly they 
might secure in supply or demand, control over specific assets, 
privileged access to information, and difficulties in monitoring 
performance to ensure that it lives up to contractual promise. The 
proposal is therefore that organisational power evolves reactively 
  9to neutralise that of trading partners who, by exploiting their 
monopoly power, increase transactions costs and lower economic 
well-being
 (Williamson 1986). 
 
Other economists working within the liberal tradition have given 
the visible hand a more proactive role. Marshall stressed the 
central role of organisation
5 in the co-ordination of the 
increasingly specialised and mutually dependent productive 
activities. (Marshall 1947, Book IV, Ch.VIII). Thus whilst 
Marshall saw freedom of industry and enterprise
6 as a central 
motivating and integrating force, he also maintained that market 
success depends on increasingly effective industrial and work 
organisation, a process driven by the innovating entrepreneur who: 
‘is the organiser in command of capital, who bears the uninsurable 
risk. He takes complex decisions with limited information. 
Superintendence is only a small part of this: co-ordination, 
imagination and risk bearing are fundamental’ (O'Brien 1990). 
 
Within this tradition, Chandler (1980) identified superior 
managerial and production organisation and the economies of their 
large scale operation as explaining the emergence of large 
corporations; Hayek and his followers argued that market success 
and firm growth were the consequence of entrepreneurial ability in 
discovering new profit opportunities in a world of uncertainty 
(Kirzner 1997); and Schumpeter (1943) theorised that monopoly 
profits are necessary to encourage innovation. Such theories serve 
to justify the power exercised by large firms as fostering economic 
advance. They also extend the disciplinary and creative role of 
markets for, although large size may be the reward of success, big 
firms can only survive by generating the operational and dynamic 
efficiency by which organisations keep their feet in the market 
driven by ‘the process of creative destruction’ (Schumpeter,1943). 
These market benefits have been extended more recently to 
include the stock exchange which is assumed to operate as an 
efficient market for corporate control, the means by which share 
holders can punish inefficient and malfeasant managers and 
reward successful and reliable ones. In this way, hostile takeovers 
  10are theorised as serving the public interest (Deakin and Slinger, 
1997). 
 
Nevertheless, economists recognise that there are downsides to 
market dominance. The abuse of power in labour and product 
markets may have significant distributional effects; mergers and 
takeovers may be ways of eliminating competition; and corporate 
actions may threaten the social and natural environment. 
Regulation is therefore accepted as necessary to counter such 
negative externalities and to contain the destructive capabilities of 
competition. But, caution liberal economists, the urge to regulate 
must be tempered by the recognition that in the final analysis the 
market provides the best opportunity for individuals and society. 
And, whilst the market concentrates economic power it also yields 
important benefits for society in the form of technical progress and 
economic growth. What is good for business is also good for 
society, and although the excesses of dominant firms need 
checking, it would check progress if their market opportunities 
were unduly restricted.  
 
The theories supporting such argument underpin what Berk (1994) 
described as corporate liberalism. He argued that  
“….corporate liberalism conceived property and economic 
development prior to the will of collective or democratic 
choice. ‘The laws of trade’ its adherents were fond of saying 
‘are stronger than the laws of men.’ Thus, the modern 
corporation, like the liberal person, owed its existence first 
and foremost to private purpose. If the result of economic 
development rooted in such pre-social entitlement was to 
concentrate the market in huge monopolistic firms, this was 
deemed inevitable. The only economic role left to the 
democratic state was to redress the concentration of excessive 
wealth in the modern corporation through regulated 
monopoly. The goal of regulation, in other words, was to 
balance the interests of consumers in redistribution with those 
of the corporation in accumulation” (pp 13-14).  
 
  11c. Summary 
Underlying the theories of markets in liberal economic theory is 
the concept of economic man inherently driven by self-interest. 
Self-interest provides the driving force for economic activity in 
which respect it is creative; but, given the opportunity, its pursuit 
will become exploitative and destructive of economic well being. 
Markets therefore provide the outlet for the creative deployment of 
self interest and checks its misuse. They serve to mobilise 
privately owned resources, provide information, co-ordinate 
separate production and consumption decisions and guarantee the 
competition necessary to counter the exploitation of power for 
individual or group advantage. However, power also plays a 
positive role. It counters the negative effects of market failure and, 
by giving command of resources to innovating entrepreneurs, 
serves as a vehicle for economic progress. In this process, markets 
are the selectors of uses of power that enhance economic well-
being.  
 
ii. Work organisation and power 
The distinguishing feature of work organisation is its positioning 
beyond the market. Labour is inseparable from the worker and 
although contracted for in the market it is utilised in the workplace 
under the control of management.  
 
a. Work organisation and power in economics 
The separation of contracting and performance is central to 
Marxist economics. Marx agreed with orthodox economists that 
the price of labour is determined by free exchange in the market. 
However, he argued that away from the market, and in the 
workplace under the command of the capitalist employers, value 




Traditionally, liberal economists ignored the special problems 
posed by the organisation of work. They supposed that labour 
markets functioned as any other by assuming that skills were 
general and abundant. Then, competition fulfils its traditional role 
  12and the threat of replacement acts as a powerful inducement on 
workers and employers to match contractual promise with 
performance. However, in more recent years, closer attention has 
been paid to the problem of managing the workplace when 
markets fail. In these circumstances, as in other branches of 
transaction cost economics, managerial authority emerges as an 
efficient alternative to the market. In efficiency wage and 
insider/outsider labour market theories, asset specificity, 
information asymmetry and other ways by which market forces are 
deflected give the whip hand to incumbent workers, who are then 
assumed to soldier (i.e. to opt for on-the-job leisure rather than 
work). Management counters labour’s exploitation of power by 
close monitoring and discipline and/or by adding an efficiency 
bonus to the market wage to induce additional effort. This, as in 
Marxist theory, is made easier when the reserve army of the 
unemployed makes more effective the threat to the worker of being 
fired. 
 
b. Labour management and power. 
Away from economics and in the more practical and dynamic 
world of production management the problem of securing full co-
operation from workers, as measured by productivity and profits, 
has remained a perennial problem. Addressing this has been the 
driving force for the evolution of the theories and practice of 
labour management. These have developed from the idea of 
arbitrary managerial control needed to discipline recalcitrant 
workers, through the application of engineering science to the 
scientific management of work, to human relations management 
inspired by the socio-psychological redefinition of workers from 
economic to social  beings, and finally to human resource 
management  which combines elements of scientific and human 
relations management. 
 
Arbitrary management. With the move to factory production, close 
supervision and stern discipline were the dominant approaches to 
solving the problem of motivation and discipline (Pollard 1993). 
In exceptional cases, notably Robert Owen, factory employers 
  13believed that concern for the welfare, education and social 
development of their workforce offered the best way forward; but 
the vast majority used close supervision and harsh discipline to 
‘force human character into a mechanical mode’ (Pollard 1993, 
p256). This had support from social and economic reformers who 
argued that workers needed to be poor and exposed to market 
forces to be driven to productive activity, ideas which also 
provided the justification for the legislative sweeping away of 
worker protection and any meaningful social welfare (Wilkinson 
2001). Labour discipline was further tightened by the 
strengthening of the employers hands by the enactment of the 
Master and Servant Laws
8. These laws built on and extended the 
employer’s disciplinary powers over their workforce entrenched in 
the Elizabethan, Statute of Artificers. As a consequence, 
‘Inside the factory ….the employer is absolute law-giver; he 
makes regulations at will, changes and adds to his code at 
pleasure, and even if he inserts the craziest stuff, the courts 
say to the working man: “you were your own master; no one 
forced you to agree to such a contract if you did not want to, 
but now, when you have freely entered into it, you must be 
bound to it”’(quoted, with approval, from Engels, by Atiyah 
1979, p.275).  
 
The position of workers in the workplace was further weakened as 
the finer division of labour progressively simplified tasks, with 
mechanisation and with the growth of employer’s scientific, 
engineering and managerial knowledge. And, it was from this 
cumulative process that scientific management evolved (Hollway 
1991). 
 
The scientific management of work. The aim of scientific 
management was to systematise production. Frederick Taylor, a 
leading protagonist, was pre-occupied with the problem of worker 
‘soldiering’. Solving this, he argued, required complete managerial 
control over the tasks of individual workers and how they were 
performed. To achieve this, the pioneers of scientific management 
proposed, managers should acquire workers’ craft knowledge, plan 
  14production in detail, precisely define each worker’s tasks and 
carefully control every stage of production. The need to achieve 
these objectives, Taylor claimed, rested on the discovery and 
development of the scientific laws governing production.  
 
Taylor made far-reaching claims for scientific management. He 
argued that it provided a rational basis for designing and 
standardising factory lay-out, equipment and industrial 
organisation, and for codifying worker knowledge. It provided the 
scientific basis for worker selection, vocational guidance, training, 
planning work to individual capabilities, ensuring workers’ 
physical and psychological well-being, and designing wage 
payment systems to reward efficiency. In doing this, it raised 
workers’ skill levels, stimulated them intellectually, promoted 
individuality and self-reliance, while at the same time increasing 
pay, cutting hours of work and improving employment security. 
Taylor also claimed that his methods improved labour 
management by creating a cadre of specialists to instruct, train and 
advise workers, and encourage involvement. Of particular 
importance, was the assertion that replacing a system of arbitrary 
managerial decisions by one in which managerial control of 
worker activity was governed by scientific laws would improve 
management/worker relationships, democratise industry and 
eliminate the need for trade unions and collective bargaining. 
Taylor claimed that: 
 
‘No such democracy has ever existed in industry before. 
Every protest of every workman must be handled by those on 
management’s side, and the right or wrong of the complaint 
must be settled not by the opinion, either of the management 
or the workman, but by the great code of laws which has 
been developed and which must satisfy both sides. It gives 
the worker in the end equal voice with the employer; both 
can refer only to the arbitrament of science and fact.’ (Hoxie 
1915, quoted in Hollway 1991, p22). 
 
  15If his blueprints were followed, Taylor claimed, combining 
managerial authority with science would remove the conflict 
resulting from the exercise of, and resistance to, arbitrary 
managerial power and clear the way for full cooperation.  
 
However, the practice of scientific management proved different 
from its theory. In his detailed study of the practical application of 
scientific management, Hoxie (1913) came to quite the opposite 
view of its effects to those anticipated by Taylor. He found that 
scientific management mainly served to concentrate into 
management’s hands the power to deskill, control and speed up 
work and to justify this in the name of science. The main problem, 
Hoxie argued, was managerial emphasis on short-term increases in 
production and profit by task and rate setting, without concern for 
the longer-term reform of technical and organisational structures 
required for full-blown scientific management. As a result, the 
weight of change fell on workers who experienced it as work 
degradation, speed up, increased alienation and loss of power.  
 
While recognising this, neither Hoxie, nor the unions he consulted, 
opposed the principle of the application of science to industry. The 
problem, as they saw it, was not so much with the application of 
science so much as the way it was applied. On the democratisation 
of industry, Hoxie wrote:  
‘It is a noble ideal, as old at least as St. Simon, and the time 
may come when it is capable of realisation. Before this 
however, the science of psychology must make long strides, 
industry must attain a much greater degree of regularity and 
stability than at present exists, and the type of man who is 
supposed to discover and voice the dictates of science-and 
stand thus as the just judge between employers and workers-
must be very different from the present general run of time 
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of psychology to industry began at the end of the 19
th Century 
when the mass poverty and degradation of work in the Victorian 
labour market led to a growing emphasis on the human factor in 
industry. In this, Joseph and Seebolm Rowntree, chocolate 
manufacturers from York, played a leading role (Biggs 1964). The 
Rowntrees believed that business efficiency required humane 
personnel policies and good industrial relations. Concern for the 
health and well being of their workers and for their quality, 
motivation and commitment resulted in the Rowntrees taking a 
lead in paying wages high enough for an adequate diet,
9 in cutting 
hours to combat fatigue and encourage leisure time activities, in 
providing health and welfare services for their employees and in 
designing workplaces to high environmental standards. They also 
provided remedial and continuing education, high levels of 
training; improved communications; and encouraged worker 
participation, collective bargaining and industrial democracy. The 
Rowntrees’ zeal for reform was driven by their Quaker views 
regarding the organisation of society. But, it was also guided by 
practical business concerns about the negative impact of poor 
nutrition and fatigue on worker performance, the advantage of 
using psychology to improve worker selection and training and the 
effect on worker motivation and performance of their well-being 
and job satisfaction. (Biggs 1964; Rowntree 1938). 
  
The inter-war years were characterised by a rapid growth in 
employers’ interest in the role of human relations in industry and 
the potential to improve such relations by applying psychological 
and sociological research findings to work organisation. Increasing 
attention was paid to matching workers to jobs by means of 
psychological methods in selection and training, the use of such 
techniques as ergonomics to fit jobs to workers, and of counselling 
to improve their mental well-being. Later, after the Hawthorne 
experiments, even greater emphasis was placed on the importance 
of human emotions and feelings in determining the effectiveness 
of group activities and labour-management relations (Hollway 
1991).  
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management rather than to challenge its authority or the extent and 
definition of managerial responsibility. They were largely 
remedial and targeted at increasing efficiency by making the 
employment systems more worker-friendly, by fitting workers 
better into work systems and by providing treatment for their 
physical and psychological defects. In this process: 
‘A new conception and practice of the worker emerged. This 
had as its objective to ensure that the bond linking the 
individual and the enterprise and also the individual to 
society would hence forth not be solely economic. The wage 
relationship and the power of the boss would be 
supplemented by a personal bond that would attach 
individuals to the lives they lived in the world of work, to 
their co-workers and bosses, and to society as a whole. It 
would be possible to conceive of administering the working 
environment in such a way as to ensure simultaneously the 
contentment and health of the worker and the profitability 
and efficiency of the enterprise’ (Miller and Rose, 1998, 
p53)  
 
After the Second World War, the importance of the remedial 
benefits of human relation continued to be emphasised as 
important for operational efficiency. However, the attention of 
industrial psychologists and sociologists, and the managerial 
practice they informed, shifted to the idea that human relations 
was a productive factor contributing to dynamic as well as 
operational efficiency. War-time experiments at the Tavistock 
Institute, targeted at the rehabilitation of servicemen suffering 
psychological disorders, demonstrated the creative possibilities of 
directly involving individuals in collective activities (Slinger 
2000). After the War, this research was developed collaboratively 
by an international net-work of research institutes which fostered 
its industrial application (Trist and Murray 1993). In Norway, for 
example, the Industrial Democracy Project explored the benefits of 
improved worker/management relations and developed and 
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Sweden (Trist and Murray 1993).  
 
These developments went far beyond the notion that human 
relations could raise the performance of traditional work systems 
closer to their real potential. The argument became that greater 
employee involvement contributes to dynamic efficiency, an 
important requirement of which was the resolution of the long 
standing problem of antagonism between workers and managers. 
To overcome this emphasis was placed on the benefits of inter-
personal skills in labour management, democratic leadership and 
participative small groups. The reluctance of workers to respond to 
the new style of management extended the area for reform to 
include job redesign. The agenda was furthered broadened by the 
development of theories of organisational behaviour and 
organisational change, together with an emphasis on corporate 
culture as an integrating and motivating force. (Hollway 1991). 
 
Human resource management. Two broad strands in the historical 
development of work organisation and labour management 
theories and practices can therefore be identified. The first stems 
from scientific management and has its roots in engineering 
science and in the traditional economist's assumption of economic 
man. The second strand developed from the application to the 
work situation of psychology and sociology, with their emphasis 
on social man. The increasing weight given to this latter strand 
shifted the focus in labour management from labour as a factor of 
production to be directed and cajoled by hierarchical management, 
to labour as a productive resource with creative capabilities to be 
developed by inter-active management. The expectation was that 
employers would reap the rewards of greater worker motivation, 
increased job satisfaction and improved job performance by greater 
operational and dynamic efficiency and higher profitability. These 
objectives are seen as requiring the enlarging and enriching of jobs, 
more challenges and opportunities, new skills and more effective 
incentives. With this change in management objectives and style 
came a modification in nomenclature from ‘personnel and 
  19industrial relations management’ to ‘human resource management’ 
(HRM).
 10  
 
HRM has been defined ‘as a set of policies designed to maximise 
organisational integration, employee commitment, flexibility and 
the quality of work’ (Guest 1987); and hard and soft versions have 
been identified. Soft HRM is ‘a method of releasing untapped 
reserves of ‘human resourcefulness’ by increasing employee 
commitment, participation and involvement’ (Blyton and Turnbull 
1992, p4) and has a greater emphasis on human relations. Hard 
HRM is designed to maximise the economic return from labour 
resources by integrating HRM into business strategy. Although it 
usually incorporates soft HRM practices, hard HRM has a broader 
engineering base and is strongly oriented towards meeting market 
requirements by means of greater production flexibility and product 
improvement (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). Key objectives in hard 
HRM, which have a clear affinity with Taylor's vision of scientific 
management, include continuous improvement in quality and 
performance, just-in-time inventory systems, and statistical 
process control designed to iron out variation in quality, create 
consistency in meeting standards, locate inventory savings and 
eliminate waste. Broadly speaking, the purpose of HRM is to 
foster a pre-emptive rather than re-active approach to operational 
efficiency, quality control, and innovation by shifting 
responsibility and accountability for decision making towards the 
shop floor. Its adoption testifies to a shift in labour management 
practice ‘from coercion to the attempted production of self-
regulated individuals’ (Hollway 1991 p20).  
 
However, despite recognising the sociological and psychological 
needs of workers, the importance of democratic management and 
the central role of worker self-regulation and involvement in 
management as mechanisms for securing full-co-operation, the 
proponents of human relations have been no more sympathetic to 
workers’ independent representation than liberal economists or the 
scientific management school. The idea of democratising industry 
goes no further than Fredrick Taylor’s view that this purpose is 
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scientific laws, except that the science needed extends beyond that 
of production to include the psychology and sociology of the 
producers. From this perspective, the power to manage serves as a 
proxy for representation and a vehicle for efficiency and equity.  
 
iii. Human relations, independent representation, partnership 
and power  
The early case for human relations was that the diagnosis and 
effective treatment of socio-psychological problems would 
improve the well-being of group members, the cohesiveness of the 
group and therefore its productive performance. From this 
standpoint, conflict was considered dysfunctional. Elton Mayo, of 
Hawthorne fame, believed that: 
‘Conflict was neither inevitable nor economic. It was the 
result of the maladjustment of a few men on the labour side 
of industry. Even after Hawthorne forced Mayo to grow, he 
remained firm in his conviction that conflict was an evil, a 
symptom of the lack of social skills. Cooperation, for him, 
was symptomatic of health; and, since there was no 
alternative in the modern world, cooperation must mean 
obedience to managerial authority. Thus collective 
bargaining was not really cooperation, but merely a flimsy 
substitute for the real thing.’ (Baritz 1975, pp332-333). 
 
Social scientists have also argued that wage demands mask ‘more 
real and human needs for appreciation, understanding and 
friendliness;’ and they have gone further by identifying the need to 
join trade unions as a symptom of low intellect and psychological 
disorders (Baritz 1975, p332).  
 
More recently, advocates of human resource management have 
stressed the importance of unity of purpose and values. Total 
Quality Management (TQM) has been characterised as an 
organisational form in which ‘employees can be trusted and 
empowered to take on more responsibility in a context of HRM 
practices which ensure a homogeneity of values.” (Sewell and 
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(where a diversity of interests are recognised) are effectively 
ruled-out and collective bargaining becomes ‘integrative’ rather 
than ‘distributive’ (Walton and McKersie 1965). In this context, 
the role of trade unions is to co-ordinate the strategic process and 
facilitate the achievement of managerial objectives, which are 
assumed to forward the mutual interest of all the firm’s 
stakeholders (Konzelmann Smith 1996).  
 
Following this trend, the ‘New’ Labour Government, elected in 
1997, endorsed labour-management co-operation and ‘partnership’ 
as an effective approach for improving economic performance. In 
interpreting the Government’s position, Wood (2000) identified 
the requirements of the new system as:  
 
‘one of partnership at work … associated with the kind of 
model of HRM … focused on the achievement of a particular 
role orientation on the part of employees so that they are 




He went on to suggest that  
 
‘Partnership is a matter of employers having the right to ask 
employees to develop themselves in order to accept fresh 
responsibilities whilst they themselves must take 
responsibility for providing the context in which this can 
happen’  
 
In this formulation of partnership, the strong emphasis is on the 
need for workers to make largely unconditional commitments to 
their employer’s business interests and objectives, and to mould 
themselves to its needs. In this way, workers provide additional 
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Labour Prime Minister, when he laid out the Labour government’s 
primary industrial relations objectives.
 12 They required, Blair 
argued, ‘nothing less than to change the culture of relations in and 
at work’. He stressed the need for the new culture to be ‘one of 
voluntary understanding and co-operation because it has been 
recognised that the prosperity of each (employer and employee) is 
bound up in the prosperity of all;’ and he emphasised that 
‘partnership works best when it is about real goals – part of a 
strategy for instance for doubling business. Or bringing employee 
relations in line with market re-positioning. Or ending the often-
meaningless ritual of annual wage squabbling.’ It should be 
carefully noted that Blair made no reference to the ritual of the 
continuous squabble over the distribution of dividends between 
managers and shareholders or to the constant insistence on better 
terms for consumers orchestrated by the Government. Rather, 
what Blair clearly had in mind was the need for workers recognise 
the needs of business and their customers by meeting both their 
production and distributional demands. And, as we have seen, the 
weight of expert economic and labour management opinion comes 
down in favour of the government’s unitarist line and lends 
credence to it. However, the validity of this support ultimately 
depends on the objectivity of the body of knowledge upon which it 
rests.  
 
The claim of objectivity is important for protecting the expert from 
responsibility for any negative outcomes from the advise they give 
and for lending weight to managerial strategies and objectives. But 
‘knowledge concerned with people at work ……is not objective or 
true in any simple sense. It is an historical product of the interests 
and power relations in practice’ (Hollway 1991, p9). This echoes 
doubts repeatedly expressed about the objectivity of expert 
knowledge as applied to markets and production.  
 
Marx dated the demise of scientific objectivity in economics as 
being the accession to power of the middle-classes with the 
electoral reforms of the 1830s. After that, it was no longer a 
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was useful to capital or harmful’ (Marx 1976, p97). This view was 
echoed by Galbraith (1987), when he argued that the supposed 
subordination of economic agents to the market disguised the 
central importance of power in economic life. He noted that 
“Power is much enjoyed, and its economic and political exercise 
can also be pleasingly remunerative. Nothing serves it better than a 
theology that disguises its exercise” (p.xiv).  
 
The objectivity of the research underlying scientific management 
and human relations has also been challenged on the grounds that 
it has traditionally been undertaken on behalf of employers or 
strongly relies on their support. Researchers have not been 
completely free agents; and the employer orientation of the 
research has determined its scope and focussed its attention on 
productivity, profitability and employee loyalty. But this is not to 
imply that researchers have been obliged against their will to 
accept managerial values. Researchers are commonly of the same 
mind as managers so that: ‘Most managers have had no trouble in 
getting social scientists to grant managerial premises because such 
premises have been assumed by the social scientists.’ (Baritz 1975, 
p334). Bearing this in mind, Wilbert E Moore, in 1947, warned 
sociologists that the ‘persistence of managerial assumptions 
underlying so much of their work would reduce their profession to 
a refined type of scientific management dedicated to exploiting 
labour’ (Baritz 1975, p335).  
 
In this sense, by becoming dependent on the powerful and 
accepting their premises, and by proposing models of markets and 
production in which power is assumed to be neutralised or to 
operate only in the general interest, the scientist and the science 
they practice become servants of power. As a consequence, by 
arguing that workers are subject to the laws of the market, 
production and socio-psychology, as identified respectively by 
economist, engineers, and sociologists/social psychologists, 
experts could proposed that it was to worker’s advantage to go 
along with management provided they were managed in 
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by workers to organise in their own sectional interests would at 
best have no beneficial effect and at worst would be counter-
productive. But the record does not show unambiguously that what 
is good for business is necessarily in the best interest of the worker 
they employ. 
 
4. Markets and systems of work organisation in operation 
 
There is now a considerable body of literature suggesting a 
positive link between the use of HRM practices and performance, 
particularly when such methods as flexible work assignments, 
work teams, skill training, effective communications, and 
incentive pay schemes are used in combination.
13 The superior 
performance of close worker involvement and co-operation 
compared with arms length market relations and hierarchical 
management has also been demonstrated by the product market 
success of what Best (1992) described as new competition. This 
bought to the market improved design, greater variety, high quality, 
more rapid product innovation as well as keener prices.  
 
The  new competition originated with European and Japanese 
producers, many of whom combined leading edge HRM and close 
relations with suppliers and customers
14. Within these more 
competitively successful productive systems, work organisation was 
participatory and non-hierarchical and inter-firm links were close 
and co-operative rather than hands-off and antagonistic
15 The result 
has been a more effective mobilisation of the commitment, skills 
and knowledge of workers and trading partners, serving to raise 
efficiency, improve quality, and generate a faster rate of product, 
process and organisational innovation. The effect of new 
competition has been to create a competitive environment in which 
top priority is given to the design of organisations such that they 
can fully exploit the co-operative nature of production. 
 
Such organisational redesign has proved very difficult in Anglo-
American productive systems. Rather than radically reforming 
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attempted to incorporate degrees of worker involvement and other 
HRM practices into existing managerial structures and forms of 
corporate governance (Deakin et al. 2001). Moreover, even when 
these changes have been successfully implemented, they have 
proven difficult to sustain (Konzelmann and Forrant 2001). 
Consequently, little has been done to change ‘the fundamental 
nature of the production system or threaten the basic organisation 
or power structure of the firms’ (Applebaum and Batt 1994, p22). 
Concurrently, neo-liberal macro-economic policies, and 
globalisation have intensified competition in increasingly buyers’ 
markets to the advantage of consumers; whilst deregulation has 
shifted the balance of power in the labour market in favour of 
capital and, in the capital market, in favour of shareholders.  
 
Firms have responded to growing product and capital market 
pressures by passing on costs to suppliers, sub-contracting, cutting 
jobs and increasing the use of temporary and casual workers. But 
the main burden of securing higher performance at lower costs has 
fallen on the core work force. This has been driven by the 
changing market demands and the additional burdens imposed on 
the survivors by downsizing and the delayering of management. 
Workers are required to be more responsive and co-operative, to 
acquire greater skills, to intensify effort, to accept greater 
responsibilities, and become more flexible. But, while employees 
have generally welcomed opportunities to take more control over 
the planning and execution of their work, distrust of management 
is widespread and the perception is that pay levels have failed to 
adequately compensate for the extra responsibility, accountability, 
work-load, working hours and effort that workers are expected to 
bear. (Burchell et. al. 2001)  
 
5. The logic of the market versus the logic of production 
 
At the heart of the problem is a fundamental contradiction between 
the logic of markets as an efficient mechanism for allocating 
resources and distributing income (as conceptualised by liberal 
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as a process for effectively combining and exploiting productive 
forces. (as conceptualised by human resource management). This 
contradiction has been wished away by supposition that the market 
is an efficient co-ordinating mechanism ruling out the need for 
human agency. In his book, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of 
Socialism,  Hayek argued that direct co-operation within groups 
was an instinctual primitive trait superseded by individualisation 
and the ordering principle of the market (1988, Chapter 1). What 
Hayek failed to understand (as no doubt primitive man succeeded 
in understanding) was that the essence of production is technical 
co-operation, requiring supportive social relations in order to 
ensure that those involved in production work effectively together. 
The task of recovering the ground lost in understanding between 
primitive man and Hayek was left to management theorists, who 
drawing on engineering, psychological and sociological research, 
concluded that productive efficiency required close co-operation 
between those involved. What has been rediscovered is that the 
primitive traits, identified by Hayek as a hindrances to the 
development of markets, is actually essential for production. The 
human relations school learned that social and psychological well-
being are crucial for creating the environment necessary for 
efficient production. What they failed to sufficiently recognise (or 
reveal) was that although meeting socio-psychological needs are 
important, well-being also has a material side. This omission had 
its advantage because it helped to steer the proponents of human 
relations away from the thorny question of distribution and 
towards the pretence of a total singleness of purpose of employers 
and their employees. However, while it may be true that workers 
do not live by bread alone, a sufficiency of bread is nevertheless 
important. And, moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
workers might not be content with leaving the determination of 
that sufficiency solely to the whim of the market or to the 
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wholly  economic  (relentlessly pursuing their own interest), or 
wholly social (satisfied if their socio-psychological needs are met). 
Rather than assuming that workers blindly and relentlessly pursue 
their own selfish interests or, providing their psyches are 
appropriately massaged, that they pursue those of their employers, 
it would seem more reasonable to suppose that workers have a 
complex set of social, psychological and economic needs. It also 
seems reasonable to suppose that workers are reflexive in 
attempting to satisfy these diverse needs, and that they respond 
negatively or positively, in terms of co-operation in production, 
depending on how they perceive the fairness of the terms and 
conditions of employment and their treatment by their employers. 
(Sabel 1992).  
 
It follows from this that there are two stages to determining 
fairness in employment: the formal contract, which lays out the 
explicit terms and conditions, and more implicit commitments, 
which go beyond the formal contract and determine the productive 
effectiveness of the relationship. These less formal terms have 
been described as the psychological contract, but could perhaps be 
better described as the human relations contract. They capture the 
commitments made by workers and their employers to work 
effectively together. The operation of the human relations contract 
requires workers to be fully committed to their employers’ 
business in exchange for fair pay, job and income security and a 
good working environment. A breach of this contract risks inciting 
a retaliatory withdrawal from full cooperation with an adverse 
effect on productivity and competitive performance. Effective co-
operation therefore depends on agreement on both the explicit and 
implicit terms of the employment relations, together with the 
expectation by both sides that commitments made will be 
honoured.  
 
In a complex economic system, however, the ability to honour 
commitments is not entirely in the hands of those making them. It 
is necessary therefore to consider the environmental conditions in 
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relationships themselves. To set the scene for this discussion, it is 
worth re-examining, in somewhat stylised terms, the nature of 
work systems.  
 
6. Work systems and the terms and conditions for cooperation  
 
The essence of work systems is that employers and workers have 
shared and separate interests. Both have a stake in total value 
added, which is generated by their cooperation in production; but 
each claims a share which limits what the others can have.
16 The 
claim to a share that either side makes is likely to be tempered by 
the necessity of ensuring that the other side continues to cooperate 
effectively so as to secure the highest level of operational and 
dynamic efficiency. The important point here is that in production, 
each party must take into account two different types of 
incentives: 1) their own and 2) that needed to get their partner(s) 
into full co-operation with them. However, the sequence of events 
is that the decision to co-operate is taken prior to the realisation of 
the benefits from co-operation. In effect, in deciding the extent of 
their co-operation, individuals give a hostage to fortune, the 
outcome of which depends on how their partners respond. The 
choice being made is therefore between short and long term 
interest: whether to take a larger slice now and risk a smaller pie 
later or visa versa. What that choice ultimately depends upon is the 
promises others make and whether or not they can be trusted to 
keep them.  
 
i. Co-operation and trust  
The essence of trust in production it that it provides a guarantee 
that the agreed terms will be kept and that what is promised will be 
carried out to required specifications and quality standards, 
described by Sako (1992) as contractual and competence trust. But 
it goes beyond contract fulfilment to include goodwill trust. This 
includes a willingness to share information and ideas, honouring 
informal understandings and being ready to renegotiate contracts 
and, in a more social sense, being willing to give and take, to help 
  29in an emergency and to forgive occasional faults. (Burchell and 
Wilkinson, 1997) Goodwill trust gives the assurance that someone 
is so dependable that they can be trusted to take initiatives without 
the risk that they will take advantage (Sako 1992) and is essential 
for full co-operation within productive systems.  
 
The hallmark of high trust systems is therefore that individuals and 
organisations working together provide open ended commitments 
to co-operate, the returns from which are realised over an 
uncertain, long time period. Mutual trust acts to reduce uncertainty 
by increasing the confidence in truth, worth, and reliability of 
people required to work together. The greater the trust each side 
has in the others, the greater will be the certainty that 
commitments made will not be abused. Trust, therefore, enables 
individuals to share expectations about the future, reducing 
uncertainty and allowing them to co-operate more effectively. (Lane 
and Bachman 1996, Luhmann 1979).  
 
Uncertainty, though, is not confined to the unpredictability of the 
behaviour of those with whom there are close relationships. It 
extends to the environment in which the relations are formed and 
maintained. It therefore may prove impossible to maintain trust, not 
so much because of unreliability within the relationship, but also 
because of uncertainty about the environment may make it difficult 
to make and keep commitments. Environmental uncertainty can be 
divided into social and economic uncertainty. Social uncertainty 
arises from the social relations which pervade production and 
exchange, and the social and political environment within which 
these relations are formed and reformed. Economic uncertainty 
results from economic forces, such as changes in technology, 
resource availability, and consumer tastes. Risk associated with 
social uncertainty can be moderated by expanding contractual and 
less formal arrangements to include a wider range of relationships; 
or by establishing rules, standards and norms that rule out 
practices which create uncertainty. But economic uncertainty is 
much more profound because economic change it is often difficult 
to predict and impossible to reverse. Economic change may also 
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greater certainty they engender. The countering of economic 
uncertainty may therefore require more radical adjustments and 
more broadly based institutions 
 
 
ii. Institutional foundations for trust 
The importance of building trust in a relationship for any 
individual or group can be expected to be influenced how 
dependent they are on the relationship and how long they expect it 
to last. For casual workers, each employment relationship is 
transient. As a result, they may believe that putting effort into 
building trust is not worthwhile. By contrast, establishing trust in 
an employment relationship may be much more important to a 
worker with highly specific skills, expectations of long-term 
employment and whose livelihood is highly dependent on the job. 
The sharing of such high levels of commitment with employers 
also contributes to an environment favourable to building trust. 
However, commitments in employment relations are often 
asymmetric.  
 
Take for example the employment relationship in one of the plants 
in a multi-plant corporation. Workers, plant managers, corporate 
managers and shareholders all have a stake, but the importance of 
the stake to each of them varies. The well-being and future of 
workers and, perhaps to a lesser extent, plant managers, are tied up 
with the particular plant in which they work. On the other hand, 
the commitment of corporate managers is to the whole 
corporation. Its future, and that of its managers, may require plant 
closure in which case the interests of those employed there and the 
corporate mangers are diametrically opposed. The commitment of 
shareholders, is even looser than that of corporate management. 
Head count has become an important indicator of the value of 
shares and this puts jobs at risk. Moreover, the ready exit by 
shareholders via the stockmarket confronts corporate managers 
with the possibility of a takeover and concentrates their attention 
on  shareholder  value at the possible expense of other 
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commitment of the least committed stakeholder which determines 
the level of certainty at the shop floor and hence whether workers 
can afford to trust. Thus whilst the performance of an organisation 
depends on co-operation, which in turn depends on trust, the 
possibility for generating trust may determined by those with the 
smallest commitment. More generally, although the success of 
productive activity requires all the participants to be trustworthy, 
the importance of trust, the degree of dependence and their ability 
to respond to a breach of trust may vary between the participants. 
 
The capability of building trust within an organisation also 
depends on conditions in its external relationships.
 17 The ability to 
conclude effective internal agreements both influences and is to a 
degree dependent on relationships within supply chains. Costs, 
prices, credit terms, and speed of payment determine the financial 
capabilities of firms to meet the competing incomes claims of 
managers, workers and shareholders; and the quality and surety of 
delivery impinges on the firm’s ability to meet customer 
requirements. In turn, the certainty that buyers will take delivery at 
agreed-upon terms is a major determinant of the supplier’s ability 
to plan production and provide employment guarantees. Long-
term trading relationships and the knowledge that customers will 
not switch suppliers (and visa versa) also make it easier to offer 
employment guarantees.  
 
The nature of market competition is similarly an important 
determinant of the quality of productive system relationships, both 
internally and within supply chains. The use of market power to 
secure favourable price, credit and delivery terms is not conducive 
to the establishment of high quality trading relationships, nor is the 
disruption of supply and demand by unlimited price competition. 
In both cases, resultant low trust relationships can be expected 
have a cumulative effect as poor standards in employment and 
business relationships are extended throughout the productive 
system by protective and retaliatory responses. 
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countered by the creation of generally applicable behaviour and 
performance standards to which individuals and groups are 
expected to subscribe. An example of this, is the effect of the 
interaction between the legal code and the private ordering of 
business relations through trade associations in Germany. (Lane 
and Bachmann, 1996) German trade associations regulate against 
such practices as late payment and unfair pricing. They arbitrate 
disputes and organise countervailing measures against excessive 
market power to which members may be collectively subjected. 
They also establish quality and product standards, and collect and 
disseminate technical and cost information. Generally, ‘by 
providing a common stock of knowledge and a shared set of norms 
for production and exchange, they co-ordinate expectations and 
remove ambiguity from inter-firm relationships’ (ibid, p18). The 
workings of trade associations are supplemented and strengthened 
by the German legal code which requires firms to trade in good 
faith, to establish just prices, and to engage in fair competition. 
This is further reinforced by the Standard Contract Terms Act, 
enacted to protect the weaker party to contracts. On the 
employment front, institutional and legal arrangements establish 
the rights to representation and collective bargaining, minimum 
terms and conditions of employment, effective health and safety 
protection and training; these citizen rights are furthered and 
protected by Germany’s works council system and sector level 
collective bargaining.  
 
As a consequence, the industrial environment in Germany is 
characterised by norms, rules and standards which are either 
legally binding or made de facto obligatory by the wide and 
systematic involvement of the industrial community. These, and 
the code of business ethics they foster, constitute expected 
behaviour to which business people conform more as a matter of 
course than as a matter of business strategy. In turn, this helps to 
create an environment in which conflict is contained, performance 
is assured and information is provided; where markets are 
stabilised by trading standards; and where the ability of smaller 
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threatened by unfair terms and conditions imposed upon them. 
Such an environment supportive of trust has been created in Japan 
by closely dependent buyer-customer relations backed up by 
supportive industrial policies and legislation (Sako 1992). In Italian 
industrial districts, a similarly high trust environment has been 
created by rather more voluntary means (Sengenberger, Loveman 
and Piore 1990). In each of these cases institutional power contains 
the abuse of individual power and create the conditions for trust in 
business and employment relations (Backmann, 1999).  
 
In their study of the quality of inter-firm relations, Lane and 
Bachman, (1995) drew a useful distinction between systems trust 
generated by laws, rules, norms and standards and the more 
personal trust which exists within and between close relationships. 
Similarly, Dei Otatti (1994) distinguished between collective and 
personal trust, treating collective trust as capital in which 
productive systems invest and which creates an environment in 
which high standards are expected. Collective trust both enhances 
and is enhanced by personal investments made by individuals in 
the building and sustaining of trusting relationships with each 
other. The importance of these organisational and institutional 
structures is the social certainty they generate. The more effective 
they are in this respect, the more successful they will be in 
improving the availability of resources and information; reducing 
conflict and the need for monitoring; and increasing the scope for 
co-operative productive relations. The important point is that an 
environment is created in which there are mutual obligations to 
find solutions which take into account the interests of all parties 




Nevertheless, periods of fundamental change and growing 
economic uncertainty can put excessive strains on organisations 
and institutions and the trust they foster. For example, collective 
voice at the level of the firm or the sector may not be enough in 
periods of rapid industrial transformation, especially if the changes 
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can be little doubt that such economic uncertainty is exacerbated 
by mass lay-offs and bankruptcies, the fears of which can trigger 
and sustain destructive competition. Breaking such a cycle in order 
to secure an orderly recovery, replace obsolete technology or 
restructure industry may require competition-limiting co-operation 
such as price-fixing, order-sharing and equipment scrapping. In 
Japan, for example, the consolidation of ownership or the creation 
of "crisis cartels" have provided an effective means to these 
objectives (Best 1992). Protection of labour standards by industry 
wide wage agreements has also proved to be an important 
mechanism for preventing erosion of the skilled labour force and 
for stabilising markets by taking wages and other employment 
conditions out of competition. 
 
Effective representation and the related acceptance by unions and 
their members of responsibility for change played a central part in 
the evolution of the Swedish model and the co-operative 
environment it engendered. An early settlement between capital 
and labour at the national level established the rights of managers 
to manage, the rights of unions to organise and represent their 
members, and the rights of employees to share in the benefits of 
technical change. Swedish trade unions combined strong 
representation, a commitment to technical progress and wage 
solidarity by which wages were fixed by national bargaining so 
that poor performance by firms could not be compensated for by 
low pay. The political wing of the Swedish labour movement 
responded to the high levels unemployment in the late 1920s by 
accepting the state’s responsibility for joblessness and from this 
commitment developed the welfare state. The Swedish 
government also came to accept responsibility for the high rate of 
job displacement resulting from rapid technical change and 
developed active labour market policies combining high quality 




  35In the 1960s, the disruptive effects of rapid economic progress and 
the growing shop floor opposition to Taylorist work organisation 
led to the enactment of a series of measures designed to limit 
managerial prerogative. These included the outlawing of unfair 
dismissal, the protection of the physical and psychological health 
of employees and the establishment of rights to paid leave for 
education. New legislation also introduced co-determination which 
gave unions the right to negotiate local agreements for the joint 
control of hiring and firing, work assignment and disciplinary 
matters. Involvement by unions and their members in the 
introduction of innovations in technology, improvements in work 
organisation and the work environment contributed significantly to 
the development of socio-technical systems in which job 
satisfaction, responsibility and learning were an integral part of the 
social relations of production. The beneficial effect of these 
developments was reflected in growing employer support for them 
as well as recognition of their positive impact on competitiveness 
(Persson 1997). 
 
What the Swedish example demonstrates is that there are points 
beyond which firm and industry level measures cannot go. 
Moreover, institutions and organisations themselves may be 
victims of technical and other forms of economic change. In such 
cases, what are required are procedural, behavioural and 
performance standards designed to encourage the development of 
new industries, new forms of work organisation, training and 
retraining, industrial and occupational flexibility. But these 
broader objectives must be cast within the context of policies 
designed to secure full-employment and environmental protection, 
and trade and capital movement regulation aimed at preventing 
unfair competition, disruptive price fluctuations and global 
uncertainty. Increasingly, these questions need to be addressed at 
the international level where as yet the democratic interests of the 




  367. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The conventional wisdom in economics and other social sciences, 
the accepted body of knowledge of how economies work, is a 
powerful force structuring productive systems and how they 
operate. The conventional wisdom is legitimated by the claims 
made by its proponents to have discovered scientific laws 
regulating economic and social activities. These claims rest on the 
objectivity of the underlying research which is compromised by 
the power context within which the knowledge is accumulated and 
the ideas refined and implemented.  
 
Two main streams in the development of conventional economic 
wisdom have been identified: theories of exchange and theories of 
the management of production. Liberal economics, which evolved 
with capitalism, rests on the belief in egocentric economic man. 
Exchange provides the opportunity for self-seeking individuals to 
develop their capabilities; and competition in free markets both 
prevents the exploitation of power over resources and optimises 
economic well-being. With the increasing concentration of 
economic power, the liberal story has been modified, deployment 
of that power being justified by the theoretical argument that the 
markets work to select and foster those forms of power which 
benefit economic performance. However, any suggestion that such 
benefits can arise from collective action is denied on the grounds 
that they restrain the market forces which generate efficient 
economic outcomes. Liberal economics therefore serves to 
legitimise the power of large corporations whist illegitimatising 
the power that workers and small organisations can mobilise by 
working together. The incorporation of the logic of the market into 
law and policy in the Anglo/American system means that there are 
few inter-mediating institutions and organisations between large 
corporations and individuals. 
 
Within liberal economics the immutable laws of the market are 
assumed to operate in the spheres of both exchange and 
production. However, from the late 19
th Century onwards the 
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development of theories of the management of production which 
ran counter to liberal economics.  The first stage was the 
elaboration of scientific management. This persevered with the 
notion of economic man but claimed to have discovered scientific 
laws of production which if properly implemented would provide 
management with the tools to efficiently organise work, provide 
incentives for full co-operation and serve as an impartial arbitrator 
for resolving the conflicting interests of managers and workers. 
The subsequent incorporation of socio-psychological knowledge 
into management of production theories by the human relations 
school challenged the idea of economic man and replaced it with 
the idea of social and sentimental man. Initially, human relations 
theory was concerned with identifying the physiological and social 
needs of workers and using this knowledge to improve the 
performance of Taylorist forms of work organisation. Further 
development led to the proposition that the greater involvement of 
workers in the planning and execution of work as part of a group 
activity improved their socio-psychological well-being and 
released their creativity. 
 
Thus, in the development of the theory and practice of work 
organisation there has been a progressive shift away from the 
notion of the ‘invisible hand of the market’, through the idea of the 
‘visible hand of management’ guided by engineering science, to 
view that hand of management requires more covert guiding by 
psychology and sociology. In this transformation, management’s 
role has been redefined from that of authoritarian, however 
benevolent, initiator, organiser and director of work to that of a 
democratic ‘facilitator’ of a participatory, cooperative and self-
regulating system. In this process, workers have been 
reconceptualised from factors of production, compelled when 
necessary into compliance with contractual promise, though 
passive participants in centrally planned and regulated work 
systems, to full partners in co-operative production. This evolution 
in the roles of management and workers has been accompanied by 
a redefinition of the workplace from being ‘pluralistic’, where 
  38interests of the two sides are separate and potentially conflictual, 
to being ‘unitary’, where their interests are in common. In general, 
while developments in liberal economics have justified the 
increasing centralisation of power, developments in theories of 
production have required an increasing decentralisation of 




These separate developments of the logic of the market and the 
logic of the management of production have had quite contrary 
effects. The distributional interests of business prioritise the logic 
of the market whilst competitiveness in product markets prioritises 
the logic of the production management. Moreover, at the policy 
level, especially in the Anglo/American system, the distributional 
interests of business predominate so that the logic of the market 
dictates labour market, industrial, competition and corporate 
governance policy. The prioritising of the logic of the market in 
this way means asymmetry in commitment, for whereas the pre-
eminence of the market means that employers can only make 
conditional commitments to their workers, the efficient 
management of production requires workers to make 
unconditional commitment to their employers. The unconditional 
demands made by management require workers to be totally 
committed to organisational objectives and to collectivise their 
effort, while the conditional promises made by managers mean 
that workers are readily disposable and that risk is individualised. 
In Wood’s words (see above), there is no evidence that workers 
have failed ‘to develop themselves in order to accept fresh 
responsibilities.’ Rather, the evidence is that neither employers nor 
governments have ‘taken the responsibility for providing the 
context in which this can happen’. 
 
Meanwhile, sandwiched between the needs of the market and the 
needs of production, the new forms of work organisation have thus 
become new forms of exploitation, made more sophisticated by 
worker involvement in the process. But as with more traditional 
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Increased work intensification and employment uncertainty have 
served to lower trust, reduce morale and motivation and turn stress 
into a major industrial disease. Not surprisingly, the greater 
involvement of workers has not diminished their sense of need for 
trade union protection, or the importance of representation, 
independent of management, in their working lives (Burchell, et 
al., 2001). 
 
The central problem is the clash between the conditions for 
promoting co-operation and the way markets operate. This is not 
to suggest that co-operation in production and markets are 
necessarily incompatible. The problem is that markets, as with 
other institutions in productive systems, serve two separate and 
conflicting purposes. Firstly, they serve creativity by providing the 
opportunity for developing competitive strategies based on 
improved products, processes and organisational forms so that 
superior forms of work organisation can better meet consumer 
needs. In this way, markets provide the means by which the mutual 
interests of consumers, owners, managers and workers can be 
realised. But, secondly, markets also provide the opportunity for the 
exercise of relative power and the securing of advantage in 
distribution. In this, the interests of consumers, capitalists and 
workers are sharply divided and unrestrained rivalry is potentially 
destructive of the co-operation in production upon which creativity 
depends.  
 
Expressed in the terms of the productive systems analysis, the 
mutuality of interest inherent in production has found its 
expression in theories of production management whereas theories 
of markets encapsulate the conflict inherent in distribution. 
However, the relationships of power within which the theories 
have been formulated have led to a denial of any significant 
misuse of capitalist power in markets or production, and 
consequently any need for countervailing forces. Thus, rights of 
corporations to pursue their interests in markets and managerial 
prerogative in the management of production are couched in terms 
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forces or the exercise of managerial prerogative is then deemed 
inherently anti-social, effectively ruling out the possible 
development of institutions and organisations by which the 
contradictions between mutual and separate interests can be 
resolved.  
 
In European, Japanese and other productive systems, where the 
management of production has played a more central role in policy 
making, the polarisation between corporate interests and those of 
workers and small organisations is much less than in the 
Anglo/American system. Rather, institutions and organisations 
have emerged to mediate these interests and to protect the weaker 
stakeholders. In this way, institutional power (Bachmann, 1999) 
has been deployed to curb individual power and this has given 
greater scope for the realisation of mutual interests and for the 
development of high road production and marketing strategies. A 
major threat to this enlightenment is the neo-liberal revival 
following the inflationary crisis of the 1970s. This has revitalised 
the logic of the market and strengthened the powers it serves. In 
the Anglo/American system, this has increasingly polarised 
income and wealth and added to the difficulties of reforming 
production. In turn, the pressure for international standards of 
trade and finance has become increasingly globalised. This has 
extended the influence of liberal economics, and the threat it poses 
to the institutional and organisational framework supportive of the 
realisation of mutual interest in production. As a consequence, 
despite the superior competitive performance of the countries 
which took the lead in demonstrating the competitive advantages 
of co-operative forms of production they are currently being 
pressed to deregulate their labour and product markets and a scale 
down welfare provision. This no doubt resonates with the 
economic powerful in those systems with most to gain from 
deregulation, and those serving their interests, so that support for 
neo-liberal solutions is gaining ground. How far the countries 
which showed the benefits of decency and trust follow the US and 
UK’s route will determine whether or not the world progresses 
  41further into a new dark age - of extending and deepening 
inequality, poverty, exploitation and production inefficiency. But 





1   The Golden Age refers to the 1950’s and 1960’s when there 
was unprecedented economic growth, high levels of 
employment, and growing general prosperity in developed 
countries plus an accelerated rate of progress in the less 
developed. The Golden Age was bought to an end by the 
inflationary crisis of the 1970’s. See Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz 
and Singh, 1990. 
 
2   This is worked out in detail in Wilkinson 1998. 
 
3   O’Sullivan 1998; Lazonick 1991.  
 
4    For development of these ideas see Biracree, A., 
Konzelmann, S. and Wilkinson, F (1997) 
 
5  Which he considered to be the fourth factor of production 
together with land labour and capital. 
 
6   A term Marshall preferred to `competition' because of the 
need for a term `that does not imply any moral quality, 
whether good or evil, but which indicates the undisputed fact 
that modern business and industry are characterised by more 
self-reliant habits, more forethought, more deliberate and 
free choice' (1947, p. 9-10). 
 
7   Marx 1976, Chapter 25 and, especially, pp. 762-772.  
 
8   Under the Master and Servant Acts the Justices of the Peace 
were empower to punish workers for any ‘misdemeanour, 
miscarriage, or ill-behaviour’ and quitting employment 
before the end of the agreed time by abating wages, 
discharging them from their contracts or by imprisonment. 
The magistrates sat daily so that the Master and Servant Acts 
so they could be speedily enforced. Prosecutions never fell 
below 7000 a year between 1854 and the repeal of the Acts 
in 1875 and peaked at over 17000 in 1872 (Deakin 2000) 
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9   When choosing as the minimum standard of living for his 
study of poverty in York a physiological minimum based on 
labour efficiency. Rowntree linked his anti-poverty 
campaign to industrial performance’ (Biggs 1964). 
 
10   Blyton and Turnball (1994), Towers (1996) and Applebaum 
and Batt (1994) provide surveys of the HRM literature and 
debates about its deployment. Cully et al (1999) reports on 
the use of HRM practices in Britain as does Wood and 
Menezes (1998). 
 
11   Wood (2000) p. 130. 
 
12   Foreword to the White Paper, Fairness at Work Cm 3968 
(1998), at p. 3. 
 
13   For review of the evidence of the effect of clustering HRM 
strategies on company performance see Slinger (2000) see in 
particular Ichniowski, et al (1997). 
 
14   Applebaum and Batt (1994) in their extremely valuable study 
identified 4 main systems of cooperative production: 
Japanese lean production; Italian flexible specialisation; 
German diversified quality production; and Swedish 
sociotechnical systems. The Japanese and Swedish systems 
are more firmly rooted in Taylorist mass production than the 
German or, particularly, the Italian. But what the four 
systems have in common is the importance given to high 
levels of worker training and the success they have achieved 
in closely involving workers at all levels in the organisation 
and management of production, in product and process 
innovation and in the development of organisations and 
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15   Inter-firm relations in the Anglo-American Britain have been 
typified as “adversarial dealings between short-horizon 
contractors, each party seeking out its immediate advantage”; 
market individualism which has traditionally driven English 
law of contract. (Brownsword 1997, p.255). 
 
16   Total value added can be taken to include material and socio-
physic component. But one side gets in non-material terms is 
unlikely to limit what the other side can get. 
 
17   For discussion of this see Konzelmann Smith (1996). 
 
18    For the development of these ideas see International 
Contributions to Political Economy, Volume 7 and 
Wilkinson (1999) 
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